

4 APR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Information, DDA

FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Additional Questions Regarding DDA Functions

REFERENCE: Request from House Permanent Select Committee  
on Intelligence, dated 29 March 1978, for  
additional data regarding CIA

In response to the referenced request, the Office of Security proffers the following responses regarding Questions 2 and 6:

a. Question 2 - Who conducts background clearances?

The Office of Security, CIA, conducts background investigations and adjudication of applicants, employees and other individuals with access to Agency information or facilities. These investigations are conducted by a network of trained investigators operating out of or under the supervision [REDACTED]

STATINTL

b. Question 6 - What is the relationship between the CI Staff and the Office of Security?

The Office of Security and the CI Staff enjoy a close working relationship in the exercise of their joint responsibility for the CIA's counter-intelligence program. The Office of Security focuses on detection and prevention of hostile penetrations of the Agency through its employees and other individuals with staff-like access to classified information, whereas the CI Staff concentrates on Agency operations and operational personnel as well as the collation of information on the capabilities and intentions of hostile services.

STATINTL

OS 8 0707/1-A

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<b>Remarks:</b> Jack: Attached are additional questions relating to DDA functions/activities received late yesterday from the HPSC(I). We ask that the questions marked be addressed by the DDA components concerned and that responses be provided to this Office by COB Tuesday 4 April 1978. We are assuming that the question on open-source publication deals with other than our unclassified publications of official reports (e.g., by NFAC). In other words, those cleared through outside activity approval requests. (Would it be appropriate to include with your response a copy of the concerned regulation?) The question on recruitment of women and minorities has also been given to Omega Ware. Possibly OP might			
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ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. C/AG/O/Compt.		DATE 3/31/78	
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STATINTL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 29, 1978

THOMAS K. LATIMER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
MICHAEL J. O'NEIL, CHIEF COUNSEL

Honorable Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

Enclosed are two transcripts of proceedings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence during which officials from the CIA testified as to the organization of the Agency and the approval, implementation and review of covert action. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules of the Committee, it is requested that appropriate corrections be made and completed transcripts returned within five days following receipt. This same rule provides that "Corrections shall be limited to grammar and minor editing, and may not be made to change the substance of the testimony."

Due to the pendency of a lawsuit, the issue has been raised as to whether a copy of proceedings before a Congressional Committee (taken in executive session) can be reached by a Freedom of Information request. In an effort to obviate any future problems that might result due to an adverse ruling in this case, the Committee is transmitting the attached transcripts with the understanding that they are provided on temporary loan and that no copies will be made thereof.

In some instances, the witnesses indicated that they would supply their response or additional material for the record. Please supply these responses and materials as well as responses to the attached additional questions for the record with the return of the transcripts.

If you have any questions concerning this request, please have your action officer contact Mr. Michael J. O'Neil at 225-4121.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD P. BOLAND  
Chairman

Enclosures

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c. collecting materials of foreign origin.

Was this the unit involved in CHAOS?

25X1

4. What is the  Counterintel-  
ligence Staff?

5. What will be the relationship between the CIA Counter-  
intelligence Staff and the new NSC Subcommittee on Counter-  
intelligence?

25X1

X 6. What is the relationship between CI Staff and the Office  
of Security? The International Affairs Staff?

✓  
In cuts  
from DDA  
and DDO

Directorate of Administration

1. Please explain the Headquarters-field communications system.

✓  
DDA

TOP SECRET

2. Who conducts background security clearances?
3. What is the process of manuscript and article review within the CIA for open-source publication?

National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC)

1. What does NFAC do that the DDI and National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) did not?
2. How are dissenting views acknowledged in the Estimates process?

Historical Trends

1. Please explain the transfer of the Revolutionary Development Cadre to DoD in 1967.
2. Please explain the marked decline in Covert Action from 1969 to 1973 (two years before the national controversy over intelligence activities abroad).

25X1

4. What efforts are being made by CIA to recruit women and minorities into the Agency at GS-9 levels and above?

X 6. What is the relationship between CI Staff and the Office  
of Security? The International Affairs Staff?

✓  
Lucas  
Horn DDA  
1. d. DDO

X 2. Who conducts background security clearances?

✓  
DDAF

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

2. Who conducts background security clearances?

The CIA, Office of Security independently conducts background security investigations under the provisions of Executive Order 12036 in accordance with standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/14 and issues clearances for access to information classified under provisions of Executive Order 11652.

6. What is the relationship between the CI Staff and the Office of Security? the International Affairs Staff?

The Director of Security and the Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, are jointly responsible for those aspects of the CIA's counterintelligence program which affect Agency security. Activities undertaken by the CI Staff are focused on Agency operations and operational personnel as well as the collation of information on the capabilities and intentions of hostile services. The Office of Security focuses on detection and prevention of hostile penetrations of the Agency through its employees, including staff personnel and individuals with staff-like access to classified information, based upon

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Two Questions From the U. S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

FROM:

Policy and Plans Group

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

31 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. PTOS telcon  
D.D./PTOS  
2. PSI comments  
attached

Your review and comments are requested by 1200 hours on Monday, 3 April 1978.

→ PTOS has "unofficial" liaison with CI to brief CI team members prior to departure on CI overseas surveys.

Neither PTOS nor PSI have ever heard of IAS.



6. What is the relationship between CI Staff and the Office  
of Security? The International Affairs Staff?

✓  
Directs  
Home DDA  
cl. DDO

2. Who conducts background security clearances?

✓  
DDA  
cl. DDO

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

HPSCI Request re Relationship between CI Staff & OS

FROM  DD/PSI/SAG EXTENSION  NO.  DATE 31 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1. C/SAG

31 Mar 78 BS

2. DD/PSI

31 Mar 78

3. C/PPG

Atten:

Attached are two previously written papers which spell out the relationship between CI Staff and OS in the field of counter-intelligence.



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### Internal Security Function

The Office of Security, Directorate of Administration, is responsible for the implementation and operation of the Central Intelligence Agency's internal security functions as they relate to personnel, technical, and physical security.

The Director of Security thus provides for the necessary investigative activities, polygraph program, and appropriate liaison with other United States agencies to obtain pertinent security information regarding individuals associated with the Agency in an employment, contractual, and/or clandestine capacity. The Director of Security, using the information obtained through the above investigative procedures, is also responsible for approving or disapproving the employment and contractual utilization of individuals, although the Directorate of Operations retains the approval authority for the clandestine and/or operational use of individuals.

All of the investigative procedures used in formulating security approvals and/or disapprovals are conducted in full accordance with Executive Order 12036 of 26 January 1978, as well as Agency regulations based on that Executive Order. In terms of those American citizens who are or will be associated with the Agency in an employee capacity, or those who will be similarly associated with the Agency as contractors's employees, the investigative actions are based on and in accordance with Executive Order 10450 of 27 April 1953, which provides the basic criteria used throughout the United States Government in granting individuals access to classified information. The Office of Security also conducts a reinvestigation program which is intended to reassess an individual's suitability for continued access to classified information on a five-year cycle, and which consists of a limited background investigation to update previous investigative data, a polygraph interview, and liaison with other United States agencies.

The Director of Security is also responsible for all aspects relating to the physical/technical security and safety of Agency facilities, personnel, and documents. This mission is accomplished through world-wide programs designed to prohibit unauthorized access to Agency facilities through the use of guards, badge programs, and security equipment such as safes, vaults, and alarm systems. [REDACTED]

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-2-

[REDACTED]

The Office of Security's mission includes the formulation of policies, providing guidance, and the implementation of these policies as they relate to compartmented intelligence information for the entire Intelligence Community. Further, with the advent of the computer era, the Office of Security is responsible for research and programs to protect the Agency's compartmented computer systems.

#### Counterintelligence Function

The Director of Security and the Chief, Counterintelligence Staff are jointly responsible for those aspects of the Agency's counterintelligence program which affect Agency security. Attendant to this responsibility is the continuing study and analysis of pertinent data, i.e., research, by counterintelligence specialists, and the conduct of special investigations as outlined in Agency regulations.

The thrust of activities pursuant to the counterintelligence responsibility of the Director of Security is the detection and frustration of hostile penetration operations, including attempted recruitments, provocation attempts and efforts to exploit nonoperational Agency personnel as well as hostile efforts directed against the physical security of Agency installations.

Activities undertaken by the Counterintelligence Staff pursuant to this responsibility are focused on Agency operations and operational personnel as well as the collation of information on the capabilities and intentions of hostile services.

The Director of Security and the Chief, Counterintelligence Staff fully support one another in the conduct of counterintelligence investigations and keep one another fully briefed on individual cases being pursued. They meet regularly to discuss the status of their research and investigative activities in the counterintelligence field. Any counterintelligence investigation by either the Office of Security or the Counterintelligence Staff, both domestically and abroad, is conducted in full accordance with Executive Order 12036 and all other applicable statutes and regulations.

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4 NOV 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff/DDO

FROM : Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Counterintelligence Mission -  
Office of Security

9 NOV 1976

1. In line with our recent discussion, I would like to reiterate my desire to maintain, and improve where necessary, the Agency's overall counterintelligence mission. Since the Agency's counterintelligence program is the combined responsibility of both the Office of Security and the Counterintelligence Staff, it can only be effectively carried out in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and understanding.

25X1A 2. Pursuant to [ ] the Office of Security is expected to "develop and conduct internal counterintelligence programs to detect and prevent hostile penetrations of the Agency through its employees." I feel that this charge as directed at this Office is sound and proper. Further, I feel that the operative phrase in reminding the Office of Security of its proper focus in this matter is "through its employees." In the area of counterintelligence programming, I insist that this Office must concentrate its attention on operations against and vulnerabilities of Agency staff personnel and those others associated with the Agency who have or are being proposed for staff-like access (contract employees, military and civilian detailed personnel, contractors' employees, etc.).

3. In carrying out its total personnel security effort, including the counterintelligence dimension thereof, the Office of Security collects, assesses and stores a great deal of information about people who have or are expected to have a relationship with the Agency. There is nothing more vital to this Office's viability than the sanctity of the files containing this sensitive and personal information.

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I think our personnel realize and appreciate that we feel this way and that encourages them to volunteer information relevant to personnel security and counterintelligence. I cannot afford nor would I consider any action to lessen this stringency and discipline regarding our security file holdings. At the same time I recognize my responsibility to assist you with regard to employees and activities of the Directorate of Operations (DDO) and will immediately advise you should the Office of Security receive any credible information which would adversely affect the integrity or security of the personnel and operational activities of the DDO.

4. On 18 August 1976 a formal memorandum of understanding was forwarded to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), setting forth the specific categories of information which the FBI would forward directly to the Office of Security. One such category relates to information "of a counterintelligence nature affecting present or former CIA employees and other persons who are or were similarly associated with the CIA." In this regard the Office of Security also has the responsibility to correspond with the FBI on all counterintelligence matters involving current Agency staff or staff-like personnel; former employees, and other staff-like personnel in the U.S. Bearing in mind this responsibility, should your office or the DDO receive information concerning Agency staff or staff-like personnel which should be forwarded to the FBI, please advise this Office in order that we may initiate the appropriate correspondence.

5. A mutual exchange of information will facilitate a thorough and joint approach to the Agency's counterintelligence mission. Specifically, the Office of Security would appreciate your assistance in providing this Office with information you may receive falling within these categories:

a. Any attempt to recruit Agency personnel or Agency-associated contractor personnel by a foreign intelligence service, either domestically or abroad.

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b. Information indicating that a foreign intelligence service is assessing the possibility of a recruitment directed against Agency personnel or Agency-associated contractor personnel, either domestically or abroad.

c. Information surrounding operational activity or classified Agency projects believed to have been compromised as a result of a penetration of the Agency via its personnel or via Agency-associated contractor personnel.

d. Information surrounding any operational activity or other classified Agency projects believed to have been compromised as a result of carelessness or negligence on the part of current/former Agency personnel or Agency-associated contractor personnel, either domestically or abroad.

e. Any incident brought to your attention which would reflect adversely on an individual's suitability for continued Agency employment and/or access to classified Agency information.

f. Information received which would indicate that affiliation with the Agency of current Agency personnel or Agency-associated personnel has become known to a hostile foreign intelligence service.


6. The Office of Security does not possess the high degree of knowledge concerning overseas operational activities which accrues to a professional employee of the DDO. Further, in view of the paucity of Office of Security personnel overseas, it is extremely important that close cooperation exists between the Counterintelligence Staff and this Office.

7. It is my hope that our two offices can continue to work together, and I give you my assurance that the Office of Security stands ready to assist you in this endeavor to provide the Agency with the highest degree of protection from a counterintelligence standpoint.

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8. This Office is in the process of developing a Headquarters Regulation which will detail the Office of Security's counterintelligence mission and responsibilities, and direct other Agency components to support the Office of Security's CI mission. I will coordinate this effort with your office.

  
Robert W. Gambino

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76-8308/1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

13 JUL 1976

OLC: 76-1798/a

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have your letter of 21 June 1976 concerning investigations of industrial personnel, [redacted] who were engaged in classified contract work with the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Our responses to the specific questions raised by your Committee are as follows:

1. Did the CIA conduct the investigation of [redacted] employees working on a project under contract to the CIA?

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Answer: Assuming the question refers to the project mentioned by Senator Howard H. Baker at our appearance before your Committee on 16 June, the answer is yes.

2. If the CIA conducted the investigation of these employees, under what cover did it do so?

Answer: [redacted]

3. What is the general practice of the CIA in conducting investigations within the United States of industrial contract employees?

Answer: The Agency conducts personnel security investigations of industrial contract employees when such employees require access to classified information. This usually involves access to new or improved methods of collection, processing or analysis of intelligence. These investigations are normally conducted by Agency personnel

[redacted]

The security investigation involves a full field background investigation.

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25X1A

Signature  
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(unless impossible, insert date or event)

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4. What is the relationship of the CIA to other investigative services of the Federal Government's Intelligence Community, the DIS, NSA, the FBI, etc., covering the security investigations of Americans working on projects for the intelligence agencies of the United States?

Answer: CIA's investigative service is completely independent of the investigative services of the other members of the Intelligence Community. We do not conduct personnel security type investigations for them nor do they conduct such investigations for the CIA. We do, however, share our investigative product through the mechanism of the National Agency name trace. The security standards, practices and responsibilities of the Intelligence Community are governed by Executive Orders 10450 and 11905 and by DCID 1/14. Copies are enclosed for your information. In regard to contractor employees, CIA investigates only those employees who require access to classified information to perform work on contracts of Agency interest.

The final question in your letter was whether one agency such as the FBI could conduct security investigations for all of the Intelligence Community. Such an arrangement would present serious problems for the CIA, particularly where an investigation must be conducted without revealing U. S. Government interest. Our own investigative capability allows us to conduct special types of investigations tailored not only to protect cover, but also to protect unique operational considerations which might be compromised if a routine investigation is conducted.

I appreciate your interest in this subject and would like an early opportunity to discuss my statutory responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Finally, the President, in Executive Order 11905, has charged me with developing programs for the Intelligence Community in the area of security, and I look forward to discussing this at a future meeting with the Committee.

Sincerely,

*Lt. George Bush*

George Bush  
Director

25X1A

Enclosures  
As stated

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25 JUN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Counsel

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

SUBJECT : Four Questions Posed by the Senate Select  
Committee on Intelligence on 21 June 1976

1. In response to your verbal request of 23 June 1976 for answers to the four questions posed by Senator Inouye in his letter of 21 June 1976 to the Director, the following is offered for your information.

25X1A 2. In regard to question (1) "Did the CIA conduct the investigations of [ ] employees working on a project under contract to the CIA?"

ANSWER: Yes.

3. In regard to question (2) "If the CIA conducted the investigation of these employees, under what cover did it do so?"

25X1A

ANSWER: [ ]

4. In regard to question (3) "What is the general practice of the CIA in conducting investigations within the United States of industrial contract employees?"

ANSWER: The personnel security standards and practices governing the conduct of CIA's domestic investigations of industrial contract employees is set forth in Executive Order 10450 and DCID 1/14. Tab A sets forth the actual investigative coverage or practice applied to industrial contractor employee investigations.

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5. In regard to question (4) "What is the relationship of CIA to other investigative services of the Federal Government Intelligence Community; the DIS, NSA, the FBI, etc., concerning the security investigations of Americans working on projects for the Intelligence agencies of the United States?"

ANSWER: CIA's investigative service is completely independent of the investigative services of the other members of the Intelligence Community. We do not conduct personal security type investigations for them nor do they conduct such investigations for the CIA. We do, however, share our investigative product through the mechanism of the National Agency name trace. In regard to contractor employees, CIA investigates only those Americans who will have access to security information as a result of their employment with Agency procurement contractors or an Intelligence Community project contractor for which CIA has command and security responsibility.

6. Also attached for your information as Tab B are three papers which we believe will resolve the issues raised by the Select Committee in the last paragraph of Senator Inouye's letter. Although the papers were prepared in 1973 and 1975, we feel they are as current and viable today as when they were written.

7. You are requested to coordinate your reply to Senator Inouye with this Office prior to its dispatch.

[Redacted Signature Box]

25X1A

Robert W. Gambino

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
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The following is an outline of the investigative coverage scheduled in cases falling within the purview of EO 10450 and DCID 1/14:

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TO FROM SUBJ. Hon. Daniel K. Inouye DCI Response to 4 questions posed by the Senate Select Committee on 21 June 1976				ROUTING DATE SENT D/Sec 7/15 D/PS 7/15/76 C/SAC 7/16/76 C/CD	
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<b>Remarks:</b>  Attached is the material previously prepared for the SSCI regarding why the Agency does its own background investigations.			
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